We give a constructive analysis of learning as it arises in various computational interpretations of classical Peano Arithmetic, such as Aschieri and Berardi learning based realizability, Avigad's update procedures and epsilon substitution method. In particular, we show how to compute in Gödel's system T upper bounds on the length of learning processes, which are themselves represented in T through learning based realizability. The result is achieved by the introduction of a new non standard model of Gödel's T, whose new basic objects are pairs of non standard natural numbers (convergent sequences of natural numbers) and moduli of convergence, where the latter are objects giving constructive information about the former. As foundational corollary, we obtain that that learning based realizability is a constructive interpretation of Heyting Arithmetic plus excluded middle over Σ 0 1 formulas (for which it was designed) and of all Peano Arithmetic when combined with Gödel's double negation translation. As byproduct of our approach, we also obtain a new proof of Avigad's theorem for update procedures and thus of termination of epsilon substitution method for PA.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to carry out a detailed and complete constructive analysis of learning, as it arises in Aschieri and Berardi [2] learning based realizability for HA+EM 1 and in Avigad's [4] axiomatization of the epsilon substitution method for Peano Arithmetic through the concept of update procedure. The importance of this analysis is both practical and foundational. In the first place, we explicitly show how to compute upper bounds to the length of learning processes, thus providing the technology needed to analyze their computational complexity. Secondly, we answer positively to the foundational question of whether learning based realizability can be seen as an interpretation of classical Arithmetic into intuitionistic Arithmetic.
Learning based realizability is an extension of Kreisel modified realizability [15] to HA + EM 1 where EM 1 := ∀x N .∀y N ¬P xy ∨ ∃y N P xy with P xy decidable (the definition is given in section 6.3) . In a few words, it is a way of making oracle computations more effective, through the use of approximations of oracle values and learning of new values by counterexamples. A learning based realizer is in the first place a term of Gödel's T Class , which is Gödel's system T plus an oracle Φ : N → N of the same Turing degree of an oracle for the Halting problem. Of course, if a realizer was only this, it would be ineffective and so useless. Therefore, learning based realizers are computed with respect to approximations of the oracle Φ and thus effectiveness is recovered. Since approximations may be sometimes inadequate, results of computations may be wrong. But a learning based realizer is also a self-correcting program, able to spot incorrect oracle values used during computations and to correct them with right values. The new values are learned, surprisingly, by realizers of EM 1 and all the oracle values needed during each particular computation are acquired through learning processes. Here is the fundamental insight: classical principles may be computationally interpreted as learning devices. An interesting link between learning based realizers and Avigad's update procedures is the following: realizers for atomic formulas are unary update procedures. We recall that a unary update procedure is a functional which takes as argument a function f : N → N -approximating some oracle -and it uses f to compute something. Then it tests whether the result of the computation is sound with respect to some target; if it is the case, it returns the empty set; otherwise, it returns a pair (n, m), meaning that f is ill-defined as an approximation of the oracle and must be updated as to output m on input n (and the pair (m, n) represents a correct association input-output for the oracle). The correspondence between realizers of atomic formulas and update procedures is important in many ways. First, using realizability, update procedures can now be extracted from classical proofs through Curry-Howard correspondence (see [19] ) of proofs with terms of typed lambda calculi, without using Herbrandtype theorems or epsilon method as in Avigad [4] . This way, update procedures become suitable to be actually used in computational interpretations of actual proofs, without the need of examining hardly legible quantifier-free proofs. Moreover, thanks to the correspondence between update procedures and epsilon substitution method, the computational machinery of the latter is finally associated to a high level realizability semantics of proofs, which makes it much more understandable. Last, the powerful methods of type theory and realizability can be applied in order to reprove results on update procedures and epsilon substitution method in new ways.
Given the nature of learning based realizability as an extension of Kreisel modified realizability, our object of investigation is Gödel's system T and our metatheory will be purely intuitionistic. Our analysis will be accompIished by restating and then reproving constructively the following convergence theorem. First, given a term s : N → (N → N) of Gödel's T and numerals n ≤ m, define s n s m iff for all numerals l, s n (l) = 0 implies s n (l) = s m (l) (see the premise to definition 3 for explanations). Then Theorem 1 (Convergence). Let t : (N → N) → N be a closed term of T. Let s : N → (N → N) be any closed term of T representing a weakly increasing chain of functions: that is, assume that for every numerals n ≤ m, s n s m holds. Then, there exists an n such that for all m ≥ n, t(s n ) = t(s m ).
The intuitive meaning of the convergence theorem is the following. It is intended to be an analysis of oracle computations. That is, given a non computable function f : N → N one would like to "compute" t(f ). Since this is not effectively possible, in order to obtain significant results one may try nevertheless to define a weakly increasing chain s of functions with the property that for all numerals n, s n f . Such a chain can be seen as a sequence of more and more refined approximations of f and can for example be constructed by means of learning processes as they arise in learning based realizability, Avigad's update procedures or epsilon substitution method (see Mints [16] ). The theorem says that if t is computed with respect to such a sequence of approximations, then a stable answer about the value of t(f ) is eventually obtained.
The convergence theorem is already interesting in itself, but its special significance lies in its consequences, which we now describe and shall prove in the final part of the paper. Since most of them cannot be proved if the convergence theorem is not first restated and then proven constructively, they provide an important motivation for working in this direction.
A first consequence of the convergence theorem is that any learning process represented by a learning based realizer always terminates. We will express this by stating that any unary update procedure (see our definition in section 6.2, slightly different from Avigad's) representable in system T has a finite zero. A zero of a unary update procedure represents a good approximation of the oracle that the procedure is trying to approximate. If the convergence theorem is proven constructively, also the above zero theorem can be. In particular, one can show that a zero of any update procedure U can be computed through a learning process guided by U itself. Moreover, one obtains also a constructive analysis of the number of learning steps required to complete the learning process through which the zero of U will be computed (see section 6.2) . Let be the learning based realizability relation. The zero theorem constructively implies the following theorem:
Theorem 3 (Program Extraction via Learning Based Realizability). Let t be a term of T Class and suppose that t ∀x N ∃y N P xy, with P xy atomic. Then, from t one can define a term u of Gödel's system T such that for every numeral n, P n(un) = True.
The above theorem sharpens the result obtained in Aschieri and Berardi [2] . There, it has been proved as well that from any t such that t ∀x N ∃y N P xy one can extract a computable function v such that for every numeral n, P n(vn) = True. However, the extracted v made use of unbounded iteration, while the u of theorem 3 is a "bounded" algorithm, that is, a program not explicitly using any kind of unbounded iteration. This is an important point from a foundational point of view: the algorithms extracted via learning based realizability construct witnesses, rather than searching for them.
As corollary, one obtains the important result that from classical proofs in Peano Arithmetic PA of ∀∃-formulas one can extract bounded algorithms via learning based realizability . This is done by first extracting a realizer from any given proof and then by applying theorem 3. In other words, one is able to give a novel proof of the following theorem due to Gödel (see [14] ):
Theorem 4 (Provably Total Functions of PA). If PA ∀x N ∃y N P xy, then there exists a term u of Gödel's system T such that for every numeral n, P n(un) = True.
The novelty, here, is the technique employed to prove the theorem and the new understanding of extracted programs as realizers able to learn in a constructive way.
From a constructive proof of the convergence theorem one can also provide new constructive proofs of Avigad's [4] fixed point theorem for n-ary update procedures and hence of the termination of the epsilon substitution method for PA. Hence, one also obtains a constructive analysis of learning in Peano Arithmetic. The novelty, here, is the use of type theory to reason about the learning processes generated by update procedures and hence by epsilon substitution method. In particular, we solve a problem raised by Mints [17] , asking for a Tait-style termination proof of the epsilon method for first order Peano Arithmetic.
Theorem 1 can be proven easily, but ineffectively, in second order logic:
Proof of theorem 1 (Ineffective). The informal idea of the proof is the following. Terms of system T use only a finite number of values of their function arguments. If we "apply" t to the least upper bound f s of the sequence s (w.r.t the relation of definition 3), we find that the finite part of f s effectively used in the computation of t(f s ) is already contained in some s k . So, for every h ≥ k, t(s h ) = t(s k ). Let use see the details. As proven by Kreisel (for a proof see Schwichtenberg [18] ), t has a modulus of continuity C, which is a term of system T of type (N → N) → N such that the following statement is provable in extensional HA ω :
By using the comprehension axiom, we can define the least upper bound f s of the sequence s as follows
Let C M be the denotation of C in the full set theoretic model M of extensional HA ω (see Kohlenbach [14] ).
Then there exists an n such that for all m ≥ n
By 1, we get that for all m ≥ n, t(s n ) M = t(s m ) M . Hence by soundness of the model with respect to formal equality of extensional HA ω , t(s n ) and t(s m ) normalize to the same numeral, since t(s n ) = a and t(s m ) = b, with a, b numerals, implies a M = t(s n ) M = t(s m ) M = b M and then a = b.
The convergence theorem is therefore true, but one cannot hope to prove it constructively as it is stated. In fact, it is a formula of the form ∀∃∀ and intuitionistic reasoning is already incomplete -when compared to classical reasoning -for that kind of formulas. It is known, for example, that classical finite type Peano Arithmetic PA ω proves the formula ∀f N→N ∃x N ∀y N f (x) ≤ f (y), while intuitionistic Heyting Arithmetic HA ω does not. In our case, one could associate to any Turing machine a weakly increasing sequence s : N → (N → N) such that for all m, s m (n) = 0 if n = 0, and s m (0) = 1 if the machine terminates on input n in less than m steps, s m (0) = 0 otherwise. A constructive proof of the convergence theorem relatively to the term λf N→N f (0) would compute the limit of the sequence λm N s m (0), thus determining whether the Turing machine terminates on input n. By producing such a sequence s for every Turing machine, we would have a solution for the Halting problem.
Synopsis of the paper. In the rest of the paper, we develop a technology for constructively reasoning about convergence in Gödel's system T and proving a classically equivalent form of the convergence theorem. All proofs will be constructive and all their constructive content will be made explicit.
Our approach has a semantical content. In fact, we start from considering a kind of constructive non standard model for Peano Arithmetic and then we reinterpret Gödel's system T constants in order to manipulate the new individuals of the model. The reinterpretation of system T will turn out to be particularly suited to perform the computations we need to do for constructively reasoning about convergence. From the high level point of view, the proof techniques used amount to a combination of Kreisel's no-counterexample interpretation and Tait's reducibility/logical-relations method. With the first one, we can constructively reason about convergence. With the second, we prove the soundness of the model with respect to our purposes.
In detail, the plan of the paper is the following.
In section §2, we recall details of Gödel system T.
In section §3 we define the first ingredient of our approach, which is a constructive notion of convergence for sequences of objects, due to Berardi [6] . It is a no-counterexample interpretation of the classical notion of convergence, but it is different from the usual interpretation. Its main advantage is that it is very efficient from the computational point of view, since it enables programming with continuations and hence the writing of powerful and elegant realizers of its constructive content, which we will call moduli of convergence. Intuitively, a modulus of convergence for a convergent function f : N → A will be a term able to find suitable intervals in which f is constant; moreover, the length of those intervals will depend on a continuation. At the end of the section we use Berardi's notion of convergence to reformulate the convergence theorem (see theorem 5).
In section §4, we introduce the second ingredient of our approach: a model that extends the usual set theoretic model of T generated over natural numbers by replacing naturals by pairs N , f of a non standard number f (which is a function N → N as in ultrapower models of Peano Arithmetic) and its modulus of convergence N . We also syntactically define a semantics [[ ]] s (where s is a weakly increasing chain of functions) mapping terms of T in to elements of the model and in section §5 we show that, thanks to [[ ]] s , we can evaluate every term t : (N → N) → N, into a pair N , f such that N is a modulus of convergence for the function f = λn N t(s n ).
In section §6, we prove all the corollaries of the convergence theorem that we have discussed before.
Term Calculus
For a complete definition of Gödel's T we refer to Girard [11] . T is simply typed λ-calculus, with atomic types N (representing the set N of natural numbers) and Bool (representing the set B = {True, False} of booleans), product types T × U and arrows types T → U , constants 0 : N, S : N → N, True, False : Bool, pairs ., . , projections π 0 , π 1 , conditional if T and primitive recursion R T in all types, and the usual reduction rules (β), (π), (if), (R) for λ, ., . , if T , R T . From now on, if t, u are terms of T with t = u we denote provable intensional equality in T. If k ∈ N, the numeral denoting k is the closed normal term S k (0) of type N. Terms of the form if T t 1 t 2 t 3 will be written in the more legible form if t 1 then t 2 else t 3 . All closed normal terms of type N are numerals. Any closed normal term of type Bool in T is True or False.
Notation. For notational convenience and to define in a more readable way terms of type A × B → C, for any variables x 0 : A and x 1 : B we define
where x is a fresh variable not appearing in u. We observe that for any terms t 0 , t 1
Often, it is useful to add to system T new constants and atomic types, together with a set of algebraic reduction rules we call "functional".
Definition 1 (Functional set of rules). Let C be any set of constants, each one of some type A 1 → . . . → A n → A, for some atomic types A 1 , . . . , A n , A. We say that R is a functional set of reduction rules for C if R consists, for all c ∈ C and all closed normal terms a 1 : A 1 , . . . , a n : A n of T , of one and exactly one rule ca 1 . . . a n → a, where a : A is a closed normal term of T .
If a system T is obtained from Gödel's T by adding a recursive set C of constants and a recursive functional set of rules for C, we we call T a simple extension of T. T is strongly normalizing, by standard reducibility arguments (see e.g. Berger [10] ). Any atomic-type term of any simple extension T of T is equal either to a numeral, if it is of type N, or to a boolean, if it is of type Bool, or to a constant of type A, if it is of type A. All results of this paper hold whatever simple extension of T is chosen. Let us fix one.
Definition 2 (System T ). From now on, we denote with T be an arbitrarily chosen simple extension of Gödel's system T. We also assume that T contains constants for deciding equality of constants of atomic type.
Throughout the paper, the intended interpretation of the natural number 0 will be as a "default" value. That is, when we do not have any information about what value a function has on argument n, we assume that it has value 0. That being said, it is natural to consider a function f 2 : N → N to be extending another function f 1 : N → N, whenever it holds that for every n such that f 1 (n) is a non default value (and hence different from 0), then f 1 (n) = f 2 (n). f 2 may hence have a non default value at some argument f 1 has a default value, but it agrees with f 1 at the arguments f 1 has not a default value. So, f 2 carries more information than f 1 .
Definition 3 (Ordering Between Functions and Terms
Moreover, if t 1 , t 2 are closed terms of T of type N → N representing respectively functions g 1 , g 2 : N → N, we will write t 1 t 2 if and only if g 1 g 2 .
In the following, we will write "s ∈ w.i." if s : N → (N → N) is a closed term representing a weakly increasing sequence of functions, that is, if for all numerals n, m, n ≤ m implies s n s m .
The No-Counterexample Interpretation and Berardi's Notion of Convergence
In this paper, we are interested in arithmetical formulas stating convergence of natural number sequences. Classically, we consider a sequence of natural numbers to be convergent if it is definitely constant, that is, if the there is an element of the sequence which is equal to all successive elements of the sequence. Hence, we will consider formulas of the form
Since that kind of formulas cannot generally be proven constructively, a common standpoint is to consider classically equivalent but constructively weak enough statements, as in Kreisel no-counterexample interpretation:
If the statement (2) (with A = N) is provable in PA, then one can constructively extract from any proof a term t :
holds (see for example Kohlenbach [14] ). In our cases, we have to deal with formulas of the form
where f is a term of type N → N, and hence we may be tempted to consider their no-counterexample interpretation
If one introduces the notation
one often finds in literature the following equivalent version of (3):
which is the no-counterexample interpretation of
While the above notion of convergence (4) would be enough for our purposes, it seems not to allow straightforward compositional reasoning when one has to deal with non trivial interaction of convergent functions. Even when there is no complex interaction, the needed reasoning is not direct. For example, one may want to prove that if two functions f, g converge in the sense of (4), one can systematically find intervals in which they are both constant. That is, if
then one may want to prove that
The above implication is provable in a non overly complicated way, but when interaction increases (as we shall see in proposition 2 below), one begins to feel the need for a more suitable formulation of convergence.
Berardi 1 [6] introduced a notion of convergence especially suited for managing interaction of convergent functions. If one consider the formula
(with the intent of expressing very redundantly the fact that there are infinite points of convergence for f ) one obtains a very strong notion of constructive convergence by taking its no-counterexample interpretation
which after skolemization becomes
which is equivalent to
where we have used the notation
We observe that (4) and (5) are constructively equivalent. However, from a computational point of view, their realizers are quite different: the realizers of (5) are able to interact directly with each other, as we will see.
We are now ready to formally define a constructive notion of convergence for sequences of numbers: a sequence of objects f : N → A is convergent if for any h N→N ≥ id there are infinitely many intervals [n, h(n)] in which f is constant.
We say that f converges if
Notation. If t : A → B and u : A we shall often write t u in place of tu, for notational convenience or for highlighting that t u is an element of a collection of type-B terms parametrized by terms of type A.
We now make explicit the constructive information associated to the above notion of convergence, through the concept of modulus of convergence 2 . A modulus of convergence takes an h : N → N and returns an enumeration of intervals [n, h(n)] in which f is constant. It is a intuitionistic realizer of the notion of convergence.
Definition 5 (Modulus of Convergence
We observe that by definition, if one has a modulus of convergence M for a function f , he can find an infinite number of intervals of any desired length in which f is constant. For example, if one wants to find an interval of length 5, he just define the function h(x) = x + 5 and compute n := M h (0). Then, f is constant in [n, n + 5]. Clearly, a modulus of convergence carries a lot of constructive information about f .
Intuitive Significance of the Concept of Modulus of Convergence and Restatement of the Convergence Theorem
As we said, Berardi's notion of convergence works remarkably well when convergent functions interact together, for instance, in the definition of a new function. The fact that Berardi's notion is a no-counterexample interpretation of the classical notion of convergence, explains why it works. We can intuitively describe the reasons why it does it well as follows.
A first reason is purely computational. Given a function h N→N ≥ id and a modulus of convergence M, we can interpret the role of h in the computation of M h as that of a continuation. Constructively, when a new convergent function is defined from other convergent functions, one will need to produce intervals in which the new function is constant. Thus, he may try to achieve the goal by finding intervals in which the functions involved in the definition are all constant. The problem is that he may be able to find such intervals for every single function, but not for them all together. For example, if we define the function
then β is convergent if g and λx N f (n, x) are such for every choice of n. But an interval in which g is constant need not be an interval in which β too is constant, because we have to find some interval in which both g is constantly equal to some m and λx N f (m, x) is constant. We solve the problem through the use of continuations.
We start by observing that it seems there is a strict sequence of tasks to be performed. First, one tries to find an m 1 such that g is constant in, say, [m 1 , l 1 ] with m 1 < l 1 . Then, he computes g(m 1 ) = n and pass n to a "continuation" h :
Then, g may assume different values in all points of the interval [m 2 , l 2 ] and one cannot hope that β is going to be convergent in [m 2 , l 2 ]. We anticipate the solution contained in the proof of proposition 2, by letting m 1 = M k (0), where M is a modulus of convergence for g and, for example,
Then, by definition of modulus of convergence, g is constant in [m 1 , h (m 1 )] and letting l 1 = h (m 1 ) we obtain that m 2 = h(n) = h(g(m 1 )) < h(g(m 1 )) + 1 = l 1 as required. In other words, we use h and hence h as continuations, thanks to M.
The issue we are facing may be further exemplified by the following sequential game between k players. Suppose there are convergent functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f k ot type N → N on the board and an arbitrarily chosen number m. Players make their moves in order, starting from player one and finishing with player k. A play of the game is an increasing sequence of numbers m, m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m k , with m i the move of player i. Player i wins if f i is constant in an interval [m k , l k ], for some l k > m k . A strategy for player i is just a function h over natural numbers, taking the move of the player i − 1 (or the integer m if i = 1) and returning the move of player i. The fact that the winning condition depends on the move of player k makes very difficult for players 1, . . . , k − 1 to win. In this game, each player hopes that in the resulting final interval its own function will be constant but his hope is frustrated by the following ones, which are trying to accomplish the same task but with respect to their own functions. However, as we will show, player i in some cases may have a winning strategy effectively computable if he knows the strategies of all subsequent players i + 1, . . . , k, even if he does not know how to compute a point of stability of his own function.
We are now in a position to tell another reason why moduli of convergence are so useful. A winning strategy for player i can be computed by a convergence modulus. More precisely, it can be proved, as consequence of proposition 1, that if players i + 1, . . . , k play strategies h i+1 , . . . , h k , then h i := M h k •···•hi+1 is a winning strategy for player i against h i+1 , . . . , h k , whenever M is a modulus of convergence for f i . Therefore, if a modulus of convergence for each function f 1 , . . . , f k is given, one can compute a particularly desirable instance of Nash equilibrium, that is, a sequence of functions h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h k such that, if every player i plays according to the strategy h i , every play will be won by every player. Therefore, at the end of the interaction, every participant will have accomplished its own task.
We now formulate the promised restatement of theorem 1 that we shall be able to prove.
Theorem 5 (Weak Convergence). Let t : (N → N) → S be a closed term of T , with S atomic type. Then we can effectively define a closed term M :
Ms is a modulus of convergence for λm N t(s m ).
Basic Operations with Moduli of Convergence
We now prove a couple of propositions, both to illustrate the use of moduli of convergence and to provide lemmas we will need in the following. First, we show that given two terms f 1 and f 2 , if each one of them has a modulus of convergence, then there is a modulus of convergence that works simultaneously for both of them. In particular, we can define a binary operation between moduli of convergence such that, for every pair of moduli M, N , M N is "more general" than both M and N . Here, for every M 1 , M 2 , we call M 2 more general than M 1 , if for every term f , if M 1 is a modulus of convergence for f then also M 2 is a modulus of convergence for f . We this terminology, we may see M N as an upper bound of the set {M, N }, with respect to the partial order induced by the relation "to be more general than". The construction of the pair M h•N h , N h below may also be seen as a Nash equilibrium for the two player version of the game we have discussed above.
Proposition 1 (Joint Convergence). Let M and N be moduli of convergence respectively for f 1 and f 2 .
Then M N is a modulus of convergence for both f 1 and f 2 . We have that
since M is a module of convergence for f 1 . Moreover,
since N is a modulus of convergence for f 2 . But the starting point of the interval in (7) is greater or equal to the starting point of the interval in (6) , for N h ≥ id, while their ending points are equal. Hence also
and hence both f 1 and f 2 are constant in the interval [L h (z), h(L h (z))] by definition of L.
We now consider a situation in which a family {f n } n∈N of convergent terms interacts with a convergent term g and we show the result of the interaction is still a convergent term. In the following, we call "object of type A" any closed normal term of type A.
Proposition 2 (Merging of Functions). Let f : A → (N → A) be a closed term, with A atomic, and N : A → (N → N) → (N → N) be such that for every object a of type A, N a is a modulus of convergence for f a . Let moreover g : N → A and let M be a modulus of convergence for g. Define
Then H 1 (M, N , g) is a modulus of convergence for λn N f g(n) (n) Proof . Property (1) of definition 5 follows by the same reasoning used in proposition 1. We check property (2) of definition 5. Set L := H 1 (M, N , g) . The idea is that L has to produce an interval i in which g is constant and equal to a, while the interval produced by N a in which f a is constant will be contained in i. L does the job by using N h as a continuation. Fix a term closed h N→N ≥ id and z a numeral. We have that
since M is a module of convergence for g. In particular,
since N h ≥ id. Say that for all n in the intervals in (8) and (9), g(n) = a. By definition of N h
Since N a is a modulus of convergence for f a , we have
But for all x in the interval (10),
Hence
and so λn N f g(n) (n) is constant in the interval [L h (z), h(L h (z))] by definition of L.
Computations with non Standard Natural Numbers
For technical convenience we add now to system T a constant Φ : N → N with no associated reduction rules. In this way, each term t : A can be viewed as functionally depending on Φ, but it is still considered as having type A, instead the more complicated (N → N) → A. Of course, terms of atomic type are not in general equal to a constant or a numeral, if they contain Φ.
Definition 6 (Evaluation at u). Let t be a term. For any term u : N → N, we denote with t[u] the term t[u/Φ].
Adopting this notation, what we want prove is that if t : A, with A atomic, and s ∈ w.i., then the function λm N t[s m ] constructively converges, that is, it has a modulus of convergence. A natural attempt for achieving the goal is to recursively decompose the problem. For example, suppose we want to study the convergence of the function * But if we want to study the function * (+t 1 t 2 ) as a combination of * t 1 and * t 2 , it is clear that + cannot be interpreted as itself, but as a function * + of * t 1 and * t 2 . We would like the following equation to hold * (+t 1 t 2 ) = * + * t * 1 t 2
As a consequence of our notation, also the following equation must be true for all numerals n * (+t 1 t 2 )(n) = +( * t 1 (n))( * t 2 (n))
These considerations impose us to define * + :
At a first look, this may seem a rather strange way of doing computations. But it turns out that it is strongly not the case. * t 1 and * t 2 may be interpreted as hypernatural numbers and * + as the operation of addition of hypernaturals as they are defined in ultrapower non standard models of Peano Arithmetic.
Non Standard Models of Arithmetic
The first non standard model of Arithmetic is due to Skolem [20] . The universe of that model is indeed made of functions N → N, but we instead describe a variant of the Skolem construction, which is the ultrapower construction (see for example Goldblatt [12] ).
Fix a non principal ultrafilter F over N. First, define an equivalence relation between functions N → N as follows:
(The intuition here is that an ultrafilter collects the "big" subsets of N and hence two functions are to be considered equal if they have equal values for "great many" arguments. For example, two functions which, as sequences, converge to the same natural number are considered equal, for they agree on a cofinite set of N, which must belong to every non principal ultrafilter). Secondly, define * N := (N → N) that is, * N is the set of all natural number functions partitioned under the equivalence relation . Finally, set * 0 := λn N 0 * S := λn N S(n) * + :
It can be proved that the structure ( * N, * 0, * S, * +, * ·)
is a model of Peano Arithmetic as similar to the usual structure of natural numbers as to satisfy precisely the same sentences which are true under the usual interpretation. Formally, it is elementarily equivalent to the structure of natural numbers.
Elements of * N are usually called hypernatural numbers. Since they are so similar to natural numbers, it perfectly makes sense to think about defining a model of system T over hypernaturals. Indeed, Berardi [7] used hypernaturals, under a weaker equivalence relation, to construct an intuitionistic model for ∆ 2 0 maps and Berardi and de' Liguoro [5] used them to interpret a fragment of classical primitive recursive Arithmetic.
A non Standard Model for the System T 0
In order to approach gradually our final construction, we first give a definition of a non standard model for T 0 , which is Gödel's T restricted to having only a recursion operator R of type N → (N → N → N) → N → N and choice operator if : Bool → N → N → N. Hence, T 0 represents the primitive recursive functions.
The definition of the model and of the interpretation function * is purely syntactical and this is the key for our approach to go through. In other words, the interpretation of a type will be a type and the interpretation of a term will remain a term. It will be evident that from our syntactical definitions one obtains also a set-theoretic semantics. But in fact, we are defining an internal model, that is a representation of T 0 into T itself. First, define the new type structure as:
From a semantical point of view, we interpret natural numbers as functions. Since the construction is syntactical, there is no need to describe an equivalence relation between those functions. But, accordingly to which equivalence relation one has in mind, the definition we are going to give will make sense or not from the semantical point of view. For the results of this paper, we have no utility in putting extra effort to define a model for T 0 , which is also a model for Peano Arithmetic. Hence, for now we may assume that * N represents just all functions over N without any partition. Now, for every term u : T , define a term * u of type * T by induction as follows * 0 := λm N 0 * True := λm N True * False := λm N False * S := λf
The definition of the constants and the functions * S and * if is exactly the one used in the construction of ultrapower models of natural numbers. The definition of * R is different because involves higher type arguments, but it is a straightforward generalization of the ultrapower construction. Intuitively, * Rf 1 f 2 g has to iterate f 2 a number of times given by g. But since g is now an hypernatural number, the concept "g times" makes no direct sense. Hence, * R also picks as input a number m, transform g into g(m) and iterates f 2 a number of times given by g(m). But since f 2 is of type * N → * N → * N, the function given to R B is not directly f 2 , but a term λn N f 2 (λx N n) that transforms n into its hypernatural counterpart and gives it as the first argument of f 2 . After all this work is done, one obtains an hypernatural
So if * R stopped here, it would not return the right type of object. Hence, it returns h(m), consistently to the fact that g has been instantiated to m previously.
The above construction can be generalized to Gödel's T, with a little more effort to be put in the generalization of * R and * if to all types. A version of T just manipulating hypernaturals is not enough for our purposes, and will be included in our final construction, so details are postponed to the next sections.
Interpretation of T in the Model of Hypernaturals with Moduli of Convergence
In the context of this work, we are not interested into the whole collection of hypernatural numbers, but only in those who are convergent. Moreover, we want also to produce, for each one of these convergent hypernaturals, a modulus of convergence. The idea therefore is to put more constructive information into the model of hypernatural numbers and to define operations that preserve this information. The new objects we are going to consider are hypernatural numbers with moduli of convergence. They can be represented as pairs N , f
where f : N → N is an hypernatural number and N : (N → N) → (N → N) is modulus of convergence for f , as in definition 5. The resulting model is the full type structure generated as usual over these basic objects and their equivalent in the other atomic types by interpreting → as the function space constructor and × as the cartesian product. We will call it the model of hypernaturals with moduli. In the following, for any s ∈w.i., [[u]] s will be the denotation of a term u of T in this new model and the aim of this sections is to syntactically define the interpretation function [[ ]] s . In order to construct such a model, we will have to define new operations that, first, generalize the ones over hypernaturals we have previously studied and, secondly, are also able to combine moduli of convergence.
For example, how to define the non standard version [[+]] s of addition? The summands are two objects of the form N 1 , f 1 and N 2 , f 2 . The second component of the sum will be the non standard sum
of f 1 and f 2 . The first component will be a modulus of convergence for f 1 * +f 2 , and so a simultaneous modulus of convergence for both f 1 and f 2 is enough. From proposition 1, we know how to compute it with from N 1 and N 2 . We can thus define
We now launch into the definition of our syntactically described model for the whole system T . First we define the intended interpretation M T of every type T .
Definition 7 (Interpretation of Types).
For every type T of system T , we define a type M T by induction on T as follows.
T = A, with A atomic. Then
If A is atomic, the interpretation M A of A is the set of pairs whose second component is a function N → A and the first is its modulus of convergence. This is an accord with our view that whenever a s ∈w.i. is fixed, a term t of atomic type can be interpreted as a function λm N t[s m ] paired with a modulus of convergence. The intended model of hypernaturals with moduli can be seen as the collection of sets denoted by types M T , for T varying on all types of T .
We now define a logical relation between the terms of our intended model of hypernaturals with moduli and the terms of system T . We define the relation M gmc s t -representing the notion "M is a generalized modulus of convergence for t" -by induction on the type T of t as follows: In the following, we will make repeated use of the fact that the notion of generalized modulus of convergence is consistent with respect to equality. Proof. Trivial induction on the type of T .
We now define a fundamental operation on moduli of convergence. The construction is a generalization of the one in proposition 2. 
T atomic. Then
H( M, g , N ) := H 1 (M, λa A π 0 (N a ), g), λn N f g(n) (n) with f := λa A π 1 N a and H 1 as in proposition 2.
If we call "object of type A" any closed normal term of type A, then the role of the term H is to satisfy the following lemma, which is one the most important pieces of our construction. It provides a way of constructing the semantics of a term ut, with t of atomic type A, if one is able to define a semantics for t and for ua for every object a of type A. since by hypothesis N a gmc s ua. We must show that
is a modulus of convergence for the function λn N f g(n) (n) and that λn N f g(n) ext = λn N ut[s n ]. For this last part, indeed, for every numeral m, there is an object a = g(m) such that
Now, since M, g gmc s t, M is a modulus of convergence for g. Moreover, for every object a of type A, N a gmc s ua by hypothesis, and therefore π 0 N a is a modulus of convergence for λn N ua[s n ] ext = f a . By proposition 2, we obtain that
is modulus of convergence for λn N f g(n) (n), and we are done.
Let v : C and suppose L gmc s v. We have to show that
But for every object a of type A, N a gmc s ua. Therefore, for every object a of type A N a L gmc s uav = (λm A umv)a
By induction hypothesis
which is the thesis. 3 . T = C × B. We have to show that, for i = 0, 1,
Now, for every object a of type A, N a gmc s ua. Therefore, for every object a of type A π i N a gmc s π i (ua) = (λm A π i (um))a
which is the thesis.
We 
If m > 0, then define
assuming left association for .
If m = 0 (c : A 0 → A), define
Then
The definition of [ [c] ] s is a generalization of the operations done with hypernaturals. We remark that only the interpretation of the constant Φ depends on s.
In case (1), we transform basic objects into their hypernatural, hyperboolean and hyperconstant counterparts (we call them hyperobjects) all paired with their trivial moduli of convergence.
In case (2) In case (4) and (5) with f := λn N π 1 (N n ), its right projection is equal to
which is equal to λn N (π 1 R U I(λn N LM id,n )g(n))(n) which corresponds exactly to the term * Rf 1 f 2 g = λn N (R B f 1 (λn N f 2 (λx N n))g(n))(n) of subsection 4. 2 .
We now prove that for any constant c, [[c]] s is a generalized modulus of convergence for c. Since M, g gmc s t, if we prove that for every numeral n, N n gmc s Φn, we obtain by lemma 7 that H( M, g , N ) gmc s Φt and we are done. So let us show that, given a numeral n, π 0 N n is a modulus of convergence for the function
We have to prove that given any closed term h N→N ≥ id and numeral n,
We have two possibilities: i) s z (n) = s h(z) (n). Since s ∈ w.i., we have either s h(z) (n) = 0 and so
or s z (n) = s h(z) (n) = 0 and so
by definition of N . ii) s z (n) = s h(z) (n). Since s ∈ w.i., we have s z s h(z) and hence 0 = s z (n). So s h(z) (n) = s h(h(z)) (n) and as above
i) m > 0. Suppose t i : A i and L i , g i gmc s t i for all i = 0, . . . , m. We have to prove that 
is a modulus of convergence for λn N c(g 0 (n)) . . . Since for i = 0, . . . , m, L i is a modulus of convergence for g i , by repeated application of proposition 1 we deduce that L 0 L 1 . . . L m is modulus of convergence for all g 1 , . . . , g m simultaneously. Hence for all closed terms h : N → N ≥ id and numerals z, and for i = 0, . . . , m
and therefore
ii) m = 0. Straightforward simplification of the argument for i).
c :
A, A atomic. By definition 10
We have therefore to prove that λh N→N λm N m is a modulus of convergence for λn N c, which is trivially true, and that λn N c[s n ] = λn N c, which is also trivial. We conclude [ [c] ] s gmc s c.
We have to prove that
If we show that for all numerals n, N n gmc s R T uvn, by lemma 7 we obtain that
We prove that by induction on n. If we show that for all a ∈ {True, False}, N a gmc s (λb Bool if T bu 1 u 2 )a, by lemma 7 we obtain that
We prove that by cases.
If a = True, then
Hence, we have the thesis.
We are finally ready to define the interpretation of every term of T in our model of hypernaturals with moduli.
Definition 11 (Generalized Moduli of Convergence for Terms of T ). For every term v : T of system T and s ∈w.i., we define a term [[v]] s : M T by induction on v and by cases as follows:
Zeros for Unary Update Procedures
Thanks to the adequacy theorem, we are able to give a new constructive proof of Avigad's theorem for unary update procedures. Here, we give a slightly different definition of unary update procedure, since we want a little more precise description of learning. This is not a limitation, since the update procedures which are actually used by Avigad [4] in proving 1-consistency of PA still fall under our definition.
Intuitively, an update procedure is a functional which takes as input a function f over N approximating some oracle. Then, it uses that function to compute some witnesses for some provable Σ 0 1 formula of PA. Afterwards, it checks whether the result of its computation is sound. If it is not, it identifies some wrong value f (n) used in the computation and it corrects it with a new one. Then
and hence it must be that U n (zero n ) = U(s j+1 ) = |∅| which is the thesis.
Learning Based Realizability and Provably Total Functions of PA
We now give a definition of learning based realizability for HA + EM 1 , Heyting Arithmetic plus excluded middle over Σ 0 1 formulas. Our presentation is simplified with respect to Aschieri and Berardi [2] : we leave out all the syntactic sugar used there and instead employ concepts that we have already defined, such as that of typed unary update procedure. The advantages are that we do not have to carry out any coding in T of the syntax that appears in [2] in order to prove our results and that the link of realizability with update procedures becomes immediate and elegant. Anyway, the differences with [2] are negligible and only syntactical and for full motivations for learning based realizability we refer to it. In Aschieri [1] , the results of this section are proved with respect to the same formalism used in [2] .
Recall now the informal explanation of the introduction. In order to realize classical principles we first introduce oracles and then learning devices that will approximate them. The constant Φ that we have been using so far just as technical device, now represents a Skolem function for the formula ∀x N ∀y N ∃z N T xyz, with T Kleene's predicate (see [21] ), coded in system T. In fact Φ is in the same recursive degree of an oracle for the Halting problem. Using the oracle Φ one can decide, for every n, m, if ∃y N T nmy holds, since by definition of Skolem function T nm(Φ|(n, m)|) ≡ ∃y N T nmy and hence is possible to give a first ineffective Kreisel-style realizability interpretation of EM 1 and hence of HA + EM 1 . Here we can assume without being too restrictive that
We denote with T Class Gödel's system T plus the constant Φ : N → N. There is no set of computable reduction rules for the constant Φ, and therefore no set of computable reduction rules for T Class . Thus, terms of T Class will be computed with respect approximations of Φ: given any term σ : N → N of system T, t[σ] = t[σ/Φ] is again a term of system T and hence computable. t[σ] is said to be an approximation of t at σ. The particular terms of type N → N we will use to approximate Φ are called states of knowledge. If s is a state, all its non "default" values (values different from zeros) are witnesses for the Kleene's predicate. A state represents thus a partial amount of information about Φ and is allowed to have default values. The choice of zero as a default value is really arbitrary and for the presentation of this paper we could have called a state of knowledge any term of type N → N. We chose however to remain consistent with the definition in [2] , which has technical advantages and is semantically clearer.
In the following, the type N will be used by atomic realizers -which will be update procedures -as a code of N 2 ∪ {∅}: in order to stress when the type N is intended to be used like that, we will use the symbol S and we define S := N.
We now fix a language for Peano Arithmetic and then formulate a realizability relation between terms of T Class and formulas of the language.
Definition 14 (The language L of Peano Arithmetic). Define L as follows:
1. The terms of L are all terms t ∈ T, such that t : N and the free variables of t are contained in {x N 1 , . . . , x N n } for some x 1 , . . . , x n .
2.
The atomic formulas of L are all terms Qt 1 . . . t n ∈ T, for some Q : N n → Bool closed term of T, and some terms t 1 , . . . , t n of L. For every Q : N n → Bool, we denote with ¬Q : N n → Bool its boolean negation (which of course is itself a term of T).
3.
The formulas of L are built from atomic formulas of L by the connectives ∨, ∧, → ∀, ∃ as usual.
So far in this paper, we have considered only the abstract definition of update procedure and have not seen any instance of the concept. Now we define the notion of EM 1 -update procedure, which is the kind of typed unary update procedure that we need to realize EM 1 .
Definition 16 (Types for realizers). For each arithmetical formula A we define a type [A] of T by induction on
Let now p 0 := π 0 , p 1 := π 0 π 1 and p 2 := π 1 π 1 . We define the notion of learning based realizability, which is relativized to a state σ : N → N, and differs from Kreisel modified realizability for a single detail: if we realize an atomic formula, the atomic formula does not need to be true, unless the realizer is equal to the empty set when approximated at state σ.
Definition 17 (Learning-Based Realizability for HA + EM 1 ). Assume σ : N → N is a closed term of Gödel's T, t is a closed term of T Class , C ∈ L is a closed formula, and t : [C]. Let t = t 1 , . . . , t n : N. We define the relation t σ C by induction and by cases according to the form of C: Realizers are always computed with respect to a particular state of knowledge and hence they provide only approximated witnesses for the formulas they realize: instead of being certainties, witnesses are only predictions, based on the hope that the state is a good approximation of Φ. The most significant clause is the one for atomic formulas: the assertion t σ P ( t) has the following intuitive meaning. The approximation σ of Φ has led our realizability relation to predict that P ( t) is true. However, σ may be a bad approximation of Φ and P ( t) may be false. Providentially, λf N→N t[f ] is a EM 1 -update procedure and hence is able to correct some wrong value of σ with a right value: t[σ] must be equal to |(n, m)| for some m, n and thus σ must be corrected as to output m on input n. Thus, from any failure a realizer can always learn a new positive fact about Kleene's predicate T . This property is quite remarkable: we are really considering a model of computation that defines self-correcting programs, which are able to automatically repair themselves when they fail. Interestingly, this new ability of classical realizers is entirely a gift of classical logic when is applied on top of intuitionistic. We also argued in [2] , that there is a close analogy between the way our realizers work and the modern scientific endeavor as described by Popper in his falsifiability theory. An approximation of the non computable function Φ is interpreted as a set of hypotheses on the true values of Φ; realizers infer predictions from these hypotheses; then these predictions are tested in real computations and if they are falsified, some of the current hypotheses about Φ are falsified too; finally, realizers correct some of the false hypotheses and build a better approximation.
We study as an instructive example the realizer of EM 1 . We want to prove that E EM 1 . Let m, n be two numerals and let σ : N → N be a closed term of T. By definition Enm = T xy(Φ|(x, y)|), Φ|(x, y)|, |∅| , Addxyz
We have to prove that Enm σ ∃z N T nmz ∨ ∀z N ¬T xyz
We have that p 0 Enm[σ] = T nm(σ|(n, m)|)
There are two cases:
1. T nm(σ|(n, m)|) = True. We have to prove that
Since for some numeral l π 0 p 1 Enm[σ] = σ|(n, m)| = l we have to prove that π 1 p 1 Em σ T nml which is straightforward because T nml = True by hypothesis and π 1 p 1 E P m = |∅|, so trivially λf N→N |∅| is a EM 1 -update procedure.
2.
T nm(σ|(n, m)|) = False. We have to prove that p 2 Enm = Addnm σ ∀z N ¬T nmz i.e that, given any numeral l, Addnml σ ¬T nml
By the definition of realizer in this case, we have first to prove that λf N→N Addnml[f ] is a EM 1 -update procedure, which is seen to be true just by definition of Add. Secondly, assume that Addnml[σ] = |∅|: we have to prove that ¬T nml = True, which is again immediate, since
Addnml[σ] = if ¬T nmσ|(n, m)| ∧ T nml then |(|(n, m)|, l)| else |∅| and by hypothesis T nm(σ|(n, m)|) = False
We thus have concluded the proof. The behaviour of E in the proof can be explained as follows. σ is used by Enm as an approximation of Φ, i.e. to predict whether there exists a l such that T nml = True. In case (1), indeed such an l is exhibited by σ and everything goes well. But in case (2), σ does not yield such an l: E hopes that σ is nevertheless a good approximation of the Skolem function Φ and so declares that ∀z N ¬T xyz. But a counterexample could anyway be encountered, so for every given l, Addnml tests whether T nml = True and in this case returns an update: from a failure a non trival witness is learned. This behaviour is well explained in term of 1-Backtracking games (see [3] , [1] )
Any classical proof using only excluded middle over semi-decidable formulas may be interpreted by some learning based realizer.
Theorem 11 (Soundness of Realizability for HA + EM 1 ). If A is a closed formula provable in HA + EM 1 (see [2] ), then there exists t ∈ T Class such that t A. Proof . By Aschieri and Berardi [2] .
As anticipated in the introduction, from learning based realizers we can extract algorithms of system T.
Theorem 12 (Program Extraction via Learning Based Realizability). Let t be a term of T Class and suppose that t ∀x N ∃y N P xy, with P atomic. Then, from t one can effectively define a term u of Gödel's system T such that for every numeral n, P n(un) = True.
Proof.
Let v := λm N λf N→N π 1 (tm)[f ] v is of type N → (N → N) → N. By definition of realizability, for every σ and numeral n π 1 (tn) σ P n(π 0 (tn)[σ]) and hence for every numeral n, λf N→N π 1 (tn)[f ] = v n is a typed EM 1 -update procedure. By theorem 10, there exists a term zero : N → (N → N) of T such that v n (zero n ) = |∅| for every numeral n. By construction, zero n is also a state of knowledge. Define u := λm N π 0 (tm)[zero m ] and fix a numeral n. By unfolding the definition of realizability with respect to the state zero n , we have that tn zeron ∃y N P ny and hence π 1 (tn) zeron P n(un) that is to say v n (zero n ) = |∅| =⇒ P n(un) = True and therefore P n(un) = True which is the thesis.
We are now able to prove a version of the classic theorem of Gödel, characterizing the class of functions provably total in PA as the class of functions representable in system T.
Theorem 13 (Provably Total Functions of PA). If PA ∀x N ∃y N P xy, then there exists a term u of Gödel's system T such that for every numeral n, P n(un) = True.
As usual, it is not restrictive to assume that P xy = T nxy for some numeral n. Starting from the assumption that PA ∀x N ∃y N T nxy by Gödel or Kolmogorov double negation translation (see for instance [19] ), we have that HA ∀x N ¬¬∃y N T nxy Therefore HA + EM 1 ∀x N ∃y N T nxy and so there is a term t of T Class such that t ∀x N ∃y N T nxy By theorem 12, there exists a term u of Gödel's system T such that for all numerals n P nu(n) = True Remark 1. Theorem 13 is usually derived through a combination of Gödel's negative translation followed by either Friedman's translation and modified realizability or Dialectica translation (see for example Kohlenbach [14] ). In our approach, we instead perform only the first translation and we need no additional ones, because we can directly interpret the resulting proof as it is. The real advantages, however, arise when interpreting proofs in HA + EM 1 , because no translation whatsoever is made and classical reasoning is directly analyzed (with of course great benefit for the actual understanding of the extracted program). Moreover, by extending learning based realizability to all PA, it will be even possible eliminate the first translation.
Zeros for k-ary Update Procedures
Thanks to the adequacy theorem, we are also able to give a new constructive proof of Avigad's theorem for k-ary update procedures. Again the definition is slightly different from Avigad's, but analogous.
Intuitively, a k-ary update procedure, with k ≥ 2, is a functional which takes as input a finite sequence f = f 1 , . . . , f k of functions approximating some oracles, such that each one of those functions is defined in terms of the previous ones. Then, it uses those functions to compute some witnesses for some provable Σ 0 1 formula of PA. Afterwards, it checks whether the result of its computation is sound. If it is not, it identifies some wrong value f i (n) used in the computation and it corrects it with a new one.
Definition 18 (Typed Update Procedures). Fix a primitive recursive bijective coding
: (N 3 ∪{∅}) → N of ∅ and of triples of natural numbers into natural numbers. A k-ary typed update procedure k ∈ N, k ≥ 2 is a term U : (N → N) k → N of Gödel's T such that the following holds:
